报告时间：2023年7月23日（星期日）下午15：00-16:30

报告地点：线下报告（管院新大楼925会议室）

报告人：陈建清

工作单位：美国德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校Naveen Jindalyl23455永利官网

举办单位：yl23455永利官网yl23455永利官网

报告简介：

Crowdsourcing platforms provide venues for firms looking for solutions (seekers) to interact with individuals who can provide solutions (solvers). As crowdsourcing contest platforms have grown in popularity with numerous tasks being posted on a daily basis, a concern that has emerged is that many similar tasks compete for solver attention, with some tasks failing to attract sufficient solver participation. To alleviate such a concern, in addition to regular task listings, many crowdsourcing platforms offer sponsorship programs under which seekers pay an extra fee for highlighting their tasks to draw solvers’ attention. We examine the effect of sponsorship on solver participation using a unique data set collected from a leading crowdsourcing platform. In contrast to platforms’ claims about the effect of sponsorship on participation, we find that sponsorship does not always boost participation in crowdsourcing contests; sponsorship increases the number of participants only when the prize amount for a task is already high. Furthermore, even when the number of participants increases, the increase primarily comes from low-ability solvers. We also find that when sponsorship increases the total number of submissions, it does so only through increasing the number of participants; sponsorship does not increase the number of submissions individual solvers submit after joining a task. A more granular analysis reveals an effect of anticipated increased competition caused by sponsorship on high-ability solvers but not on those of low ability, explaining the difference in their participation decisions when facing sponsored tasks. We also find the effect of sponsorship weakens over the duration of a task for high-ability solvers and is also weaker for solvers with more experience on the platform.

报告人简介：

陈建清教授,美国德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校Naveen Jindalyl23455永利官网Ashbel Smith教授。主要从事平台商业模式、在线广告及定价、网络拍卖机制设计、在线社区和用户创造内容、信息系统经济学等领域的研究。在Information Systems Research, MIS Quarterly, Management Science, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Marketing, Production and Operations Management, and Journal of Management Information Systems等国际顶级期刊发表二十多篇论文。目前担任Information Systems Research副编辑, Production and Operations Management资深编辑。2019年获得Dean’s Award for Outstanding New Scholar, 2016年获得ISS Sandra A. Slaughter Early Career Award of INFORMs，2007、2012、2015年获得中国信息管理夏季研讨会最佳论文奖(China Summer Workshop on Information Management，CSWIM)，2010年获得第十五届信息系统与技术研讨会最佳论文奖(Conference on Information Systems and Technology, CIST)。另外，陈教授荣获Information Systems Research 2019年的最佳副编辑， 荣获International Conference on Information Systems 2021和2022年的最佳副编辑。他共同主席组织了CSWIM 2016, 2013年的E-Business Cluster of INFORMs，2014年的Information Systems Cluster of INFORMs等。他曾任2020年INFORMS E-Business Section的主席。